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The Devil in the Details: How the Complexity, 
Costs, and Uncertainty of Treasury Regulations 
Encourage Corporate Inversion 
JESSICA WILSON* 
Politicians and scholars have discussed reforming the corporate tax system for many 
years, especially with the emergence of certain tax avoidance practices like inversion 
and earnings stripping. While debate in this area has focused primarily on making 
changes to the high corporate tax rate and the taxation of worldwide income in the 
United States as ways to reverse the inversion problem, less discussion has focused on 
how the Treasury’s punitive approach via tax regulations can have the effect of 
encouraging, rather than discouraging, firms to relocate and shift profits overseas. 
Even considering the recent developments in international tax law under the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation (“OECD”) Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(“BEPS”) project and recent rulings by the European Commission, which focus on 
corporate tax avoidance, a corporation can greatly reduce its tax and compliance 
burden by relocating to a foreign jurisdiction. 
 
This Note examines the added burden of the U.S. Treasury’s approach to dealing with 
corporate inversion, with a detailed discussion of the Treasury’s 2016 anti-inversion 
regulations. Furthermore, this Note examines the costs and burdens associated with 
remaining a U.S. company for tax purposes, as compared to some of the costs and 
benefits associated with inversion. It argues that for many companies, the complexity 
and costs under corporate tax regulations in the U.S. provide an incentive for 
inversion separate from that of the high corporate tax rate and taxation of worldwide 
income. 
  
 
 * J.D. Candidate 2018, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Many thanks to 
Professor Manoj Viswanathan for his guidance and encouragement in writing this Note, and to the editors 
of the Hastings Law Journal for their dedication and support. 
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“The goal of tax policy is to design a tax system that produces the 
desired amount of revenue and balances the minimization of these 
costs with other objectives, such as equity, transparency, and 
administrability.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, much public attention has been given to the laws 
governing the taxation of multinational corporations (“MNCs”). Led by 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”), tax authorities have discussed the inconsistencies of tax rules 
where a corporate entity spans multiple jurisdictions.2 For the United 
States in particular, the varied tax treatment of MNCs in other 
jurisdictions, paired with the United States’ relatively burdensome 
corporate tax laws, has resulted in corporations shifting their 
headquarters and profits overseas.3 The benefits of escaping from¾and 
the burdens of remaining under¾the U.S. tax system have resulted in 
more than 50 large U.S. MNCs relocating to other jurisdictions over the 
past three decades;4 over $2 trillion of accumulated corporate profits 
stashed overseas;5 and an estimated $111 billion loss in tax revenue.6 
Rather than addressing the core problems of the tax system that motivate 
this movement of income and headquarters overseas, the Treasury has 
responded to each series of transactions with regulations that have 
dramatically complicated corporate tax laws and added to the heavy 
compliance burden for U.S. businesses.7 Notably, the U.S. Department of 
Treasury’s (“Treasury”) recent anti-inversion action has increased these 
burdens by issuing rules restricting certain routine practices for 
businesses, significantly raising the standards and costs of compliance 
and disallowing important tax attributes for certain transactions. While 
the majority of debate in this area maintains that inversion stems from 
 
 1. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-878, TAX POLICY: SUMMARY OF ESTIMATES OF THE 
COSTS OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM (2005). 
 2. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT 
SHIFTING (2013). 
 3. Zachary Mider, Tax Inversion, BLOOMBERG QUICK TAKE (Mar. 2, 2017, 9:35 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/tax-inversion. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Robert W. Wood, Despite FATCA, U.S. Companies Stash $2.1 Trillion Abroad—
Untaxed, FORBES (Mar. 5, 2015, 8:24 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2015/03/05/ 
despite-fatca-u-s-companies-stash-2-1-trillion-abroad-untaxed/#44d4192c100f. 
 6. Howard Gleckman, How Much Revenue the U.S. Is Losing Through Tax Inversions, and How 
Much Worse It May Get, FORBES (Jan. 26, 2016, 12:57 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
beltway/2016/01/26/tyco-tax-inversions-income-shifting-and-lost-revenue/#fc6ba624867a. 
 7. See, e.g., text accompanying infra notes 107-125. 
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the high corporate tax rate and taxation on worldwide profits, the 
regulations governing corporate tax in the United States have become 
such an obstacle to corporate goals that the regulatory scheme provides 
a strong incentive for inversion all on its own. 
With high stakes for both companies and governments, many have 
contributed to debate in these areas, with detailed plans and predictions 
for what the state of business and international tax will¾or should¾look 
like in the upcoming years. However, in November 2016, the United 
States saw the election of Donald Trump¾a former reality television star 
who has never previously held elected office¾to the Office of the 
President. President Trump’s tax plan proposes some drastic alterations 
to tax law that may result in significant changes to the trends and 
practices of both businesses and governments. 
A fundamental obstacle to tax reform, however, is that where a 
benefit is given in one area, it must be offset by some other area. This 
reality has led to months of debate and multiple amendments to any draft 
tax reform in 2017.8 By mid-November 2017, the Republican tax plan 
remains uncertain, as there has been a constant tug-of-war between the 
proposed tax cuts and the limit on increases to the federal deficit.9 While 
changes will very likely come in 2018 and the following years, there are 
currently mixed signals as to what the corporate tax arena will look like 
under the Trump administration.10 Because any changes resulting from 
Trump’s presidency are speculative at the time of writing this Note, this 
writing focuses on the state of the U.S. corporate tax system prior to any 
changes taking place in 2018. 
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the issue of 
corporate inversion, outlining some of the incentives for corporations to 
relocate, the scale of the problem in the United States, and the relevant 
 
 8. Jacob Pramuk, House GOP Moving Full Speed to Get Tax Reform Done by Year-End, CNBC 
(Nov. 14, 2017, 12:25 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/14/house-will-vote-on-tax-reform-bill-
on-thursday.html.  
 9. See JIM NUNNS, ET AL., AN ANALYSIS OF DONALD TRUMP’S TAX PLAN, TAX POL’Y CTR. 2, 5, 11, 21, 
23–24 (2015). Estimates of the cost to lowering the corporate tax rate have predicted that the federal 
revenue would suffer by $9.5 trillion in the first ten years. Id. at 1, 6. Other estimates have predicted 
between $4.4 trillion and $5.9 trillion in just one year. See ALAN COLE, DETAILS AND ANALYSIS OF THE 
DONALD TRUMP TAX REFORM PLAN SEPTEMBER 2016, TAX FOUND. 1 (2016). Tax reform was a hot topic 
throughout the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and, following the results, House Republicans have 
said that they plan to move forward with a tax overhaul, and that they will “be ready to move this early 
in 2017.” Ways and Means Committee Chairman Kevin Brady at the Wall Street Journal CEO Council 
in Washington, quoted in Naomi Jagoda, House Panel Readying Tax Bill for Early Next Year, THE 
HILL (Nov. 15, 2016, 1:40 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/306124-house-panel-readying-tax-
bill-for-early-next-year. 
 10. See Bob Bryan, Senate Republicans Release Major Changes to Their Tax Plan That Would 
Make Your Tax Cut Temporary, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 15, 2017, 8:55 AM), http://www.business 
insider.com/trump-gop-tax-plan-senate-bill-individual-rate-cut-2017-11.  
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developments in international tax law bearing the potential to influence 
inversion. Part II examines the approach of the Treasury in addressing 
the issue of corporate inversion, highlighting specifically the added costs 
associated with anti-inversion regulations issued in 2016. Part III seeks 
to illustrate how the Treasury’s approach can have the effect of 
encouraging inversion for companies with certain characteristics, and 
how this approach is contrary to the Treasury’s goal of keeping 
corporations in the United States and collecting revenue. 
I.  CORPORATE INVERSION 
Debate on business tax reform has focused on two fundamental 
aspects of corporate and international tax law. First, tax burdens 
imposed by an MNC’s home country affect the MNC’s decision of where 
to place its headquarters.11 High tax rates and the imposition of taxation 
on foreign profits in a company’s home country can result in the company 
seeking to relocate.12 Second, having and keeping an MNC within a 
jurisdiction brings benefits to that jurisdiction.13 
A corporate “inversion,” or “expatriation,” is a transaction in which 
a U.S. based MNC restructures so that the U.S. parent is relocated in a 
foreign jurisdiction.14 In the past two decades, the share of worldwide 
income from U.S. based MNCs that is declared abroad has dramatically 
increased.15 This trend of moving corporate funds overseas is known as 
“income shifting.”16 One way a company accomplishes this is through 
inversion transactions, in which the corporation relocates so that it can 
shift its income to a jurisdiction with a lower tax burden.17 These 
corporate inversions, which occur through the company’s transfer of 
stock or assets to a foreign corporation, have been a popular method of 
shifting income and reducing tax liability.18 While corporations all over 
the world have used this tactic for many years, there is evidence of 
 
 11. Omri Marian, Home-Country Effects of Corporate Inversions, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1, 14 (2015). 
 12. Johannes Voget, Relocation of Headquarters and International Taxation, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 
1067, 1079 (2010). 
 13. Kimberly A. Clausing, Should Tax Policy Target Multinational Firm Headquarters?,  
63 NAT’L TAX J. 741, 744–45 (2010). 
 14. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Additional Treasury Actions to Rein in 
Corporate Tax Inversions (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/ 
press-releases/Pages/jl0281.aspx. 
 15. See Wood, supra note 5. 
 16. Charles W. Christian & Thomas D. Shultz, ROA-Based Estimates of Income Shifting by U.S. 
Multinational Corporations, in RECENT RESEARCH ON TAX ADMINISTRATION AND COMPLIANCE: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2005 IRS RESEARCH CONFERENCE, STATISTICS INCOME DIVISION, IRS 57 (2005). 
 17. See DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43568, CORPORATE 
EXPATRIATION, INVERSIONS, AND MERGERS: TAX ISSUES (2014). 
 18. OFFICE OF TAX POL’Y U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREAS., CORPORATE INVERSION TRANSACTIONS: TAX 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 2 (2002). 
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income shifting specifically from the United States.19 The increase in 
corporations relocating from the United States is partially the result of 
other countries adopting less strict corporate tax rules, lowering their 
corporate income tax, and operating under a territorial system through 
which a corporation’s foreign profits are not subject to tax within the 
jurisdiction.20 The United States, on the other hand, has not only held on 
to its undesirable tax features, but has continued to add to them. Apart 
from the United States having the highest corporate tax rate of all 
member countries of the OECD and subjecting U.S. corporations to tax 
on worldwide profits, the U.S. Treasury often complicates the tax rules 
and adds costs through the promulgation of regulations.21 
A. THE SCALE OF THE PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES 
Over the past thirty years, the U.S. has seen many of its corporations 
relocate to foreign jurisdictions. In 2000, the United States hosted 179 of 
the Fortune Global 500 companies.22 In 2013, that number was reduced 
to 132.23 In 2014, that number decreased to 128, with a total loss of 51 
companies over 14 years.24 These corporations did not disappear from 
the United States by going out of business or merging with each other. 
Rather, they engaged in inversion transactions, which allowed them not 
to be treated as U.S. corporations for tax purposes. While a primary 
objective of inversion is to reduce the tax liability of the corporation, 
inversion can also reduce its overall tax burden¾that is, the company 
can pay less in tax liability and reduce the costs of compliance and 
planning.25 This relocation¾at least on paper¾to a low-tax jurisdiction 
allows the inverted corporation to avoid being subject to the burdensome 
and complicated corporate tax system in the United States. 
B. THE ALLURE OF INVERSION FOR U.S. MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES 
Two major features of the U.S. tax system contributing to the appeal 
of inversion are its high corporate tax rate and the “worldwide” corporate 
 
 19. Harry Grubert, Foreign Taxes and the Growing Share of Multinational Company Income 
Abroad: Profits, Not Sales, Are Being Globalized, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 247, 247 (2012). 
 20. See MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 17. 
 21. “Statutory Corporate Income Tax Rate,” Table II.1, Tax Database, Country Representatives 
on the OECD Working Party 2: Tax Policy and Tax Statistics of the Comm. on Fiscal Affairs, 
http://stats.oecd.org//Index.aspx?DataSEtCode=TABLE_II1 (on file with Author). 
 22.  Bob Carroll et al., The Changing Headquarters Landscape for Fortune Global 500 
Companies, 240 DAILY TAX REP. J-1, 1 (Dec. 15, 2014). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Nile Nwogu & Barry Plunkett, Corporate Inversions: A Policy Primer, PENN WHARTON 
SCH. BUS. PUB. POL’Y INITIATIVE (Oct. 24, 2016), https://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/live/news/ 
1492-corporate-inversions-a-policy-primer. 
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tax system. Under a worldwide tax system, a domestic corporation is 
taxed on profits from all income, whether that income is derived in the 
United States or abroad.26 Most other countries operate under a 
“territorial” system, taxing only income from within the country.27 In 
addition to employing a worldwide system, the United States has a top 
corporate income tax rate of thirty-five percent, which is a clear 
motivation for inversion when compared to the United Kingdom at 
twenty percent, Luxembourg at nineteen percent28, Ireland at 12.5 
percent, Canada at fifteen percent29, and the Cayman Islands at zero 
percent.30 
These unattractive features of the U.S. corporate tax system are 
seemingly an easy fix. The United States could, like most other countries, 
lower its corporate tax rate and adopt territorial taxation. A possible 
reason for the lack of change is the notion that lowering the corporate tax 
rate and shifting to a territorial system would be giving in to the needs of 
wealthy corporations. Thus, although this solution has been widely 
discussed, it has generally been disregarded for political reasons.31 
A third feature of the U.S. corporate tax system, which contributes 
to the greatest amount of change in the law from year to year, is the 
Treasury’s authority to interpret the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) and 
issue regulations thereunder.32 The Treasury’s approach after each wave 
of inversions has been to issue regulations addressing the specific 
features of the transaction.33 These regulations typically examine what 
methods were used in the most recent inversions and then create a new 
 
 26. See Thorton Matheson et al., Territorial vs. Worldwide Corporate Taxation: Implications 
for Developing Countries 3–4 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper, Paper No. WP/13/205, 2013) 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13205.pdf. 
 27. Id. 
 28. 2017 Luxembourg Tax Reform Voted by the Luxembourg Parliament, BAKER MCKENZIE (Dec. 
16, 2016), http://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2016/12/2017-luxembourg-tax-
reform-voted/. 
 29. Canada provides a basic rate of tax at thirty-eight percent of taxable income, which is then 
reduced to twenty-eight percent after federal tax abatement. Corporation Tax Rates, Government of 
Candada, https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/tax/businesses/topics/corporations/ 
corporation-tax-rates.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2017). After a general tax reduction, the federal 
corporate tax rate is fifteen percent, not including the varying provincial or territorial rates. Id.  
 30. KPMG, Corporate Tax Rates Table, KPMG INT’L COOPERATIVE, https://home.kpmg. 
com/xx/en/home/services/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/tax-rates-online/corporate-tax-rates-table. 
html (last visited Nov. 21, 2017). 
 31. See DELOITTE, THE POLITICS OF TAX REFORM IN THE 114TH CONGRESS 3–9 (Apr. 15, 2015), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/Tax/us-tax-the-politics-of-tax-
reform-in-the-114th-congress-041415.pdf; see also John W. Diamond et al., The Dynamic Economic 
Effects of a U.S. Corporate Income Tax Rate Reduction (Oxford U. Ctr. for Bus. Taxation, Working 
Paper No. 14/05, 2014). 
 32. See I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2016). 
 33. See MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 17, at 9. 
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rule with higher standards and higher costs for being treated as a  
non-U.S. corporation. As a result, any corporation undertaking the same 
type of transaction will be treated as a U.S. corporation for tax purposes 
and still be subject to U.S. tax; thus limiting or eliminating the benefits 
of these transactions.34 
1.   Factors Impacting Location Decisions for Multinational 
Entities 
Deeply rooted in the U.S. legal system is the notion that corporations 
are “organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the 
stockholders.”35 Thus, when a corporation is placed under certain 
pressures that inhibit the ability of the firm to maximize shareholder 
value, it has a duty to examine the obstacles faced and pursue strategies 
that better accommodate reaching this goal. For example, in 2013, a 
global survey that interviewed a sample of the world’s largest 
multinational research and development investors found that three 
factors primarily affect a firm’s decision on where to invest, two of which 
were tax “planning certainty and simplicity” in the tax law.36 In 2016, a 
survey examining the concerns of corporate officers found that  
over-regulation continued to be a primary interest.37 Nearly half of the 
executives surveyed cited compliance with unclear regulations as adding 
to the cost of doing business, which is then often passed on to consumers 
through price increases.38 When conducting business under unclear and 
inconsistent standards, companies face the issue of trying to balance 
shareholder expectations of growth and profitability with staying outside 
the reach of the often harsh consequences of the tax rules.39 
When excessive time and money are required for compliance with 
the tax code and regulations thereunder, businesses consume resources 
that could otherwise be used for investment purposes and business 
operations, which contribute to the growth and value of the firm. Because 
the management of an MNC seeks to structure investment and financing 
 
 34. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of the Treasury, Treasury’s Final Earnings Stripping 
Regulations to Narrowly Target Corporate Transactions That Erode U.S. Tax Base (Oct. 13, 2016), 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0580.aspx. 
 35. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
 36. JOST H. HECKEMEYER ET AL., A SURVEY OF TAXATION & CORPORATE INNOVATION, 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 13 (Aug. 2015), https://www.pwc.de/de/steuerberatung/assets/ 
pwc-a-survey-of-taxation-and-corporate-innovation-2015.pdf. The third factor identified as affecting 
location decisions for investment in this survey is the “immediate impact on liquidity.” Id. 
 37. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 19TH ANNUAL GLOBAL CEO SURVEY: REDEFINING BUSINESS 
SUCCESS IN A CHANGING WORLD 2 (2016), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/ceo-survey/2016/ 
landing-page/pwc-19th-annual-global-ceo-survey.pdf. 
 38. Id. at 18. 
 39. Id. at 19. 
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decisions that maximize the firm’s value, it is essential that management 
prioritize the most efficient use of the company’s capital.40 While there 
are certainly other factors to be weighed, the way MNCs are taxed 
“importantly affects their investment decisions, their location decisions, 
and how they finance themselves.”41 
a. Stability in Legal Regime 
Theory on MNCs suggests that the choices it makes regarding 
location are a function of the need to reach corporate goals and create 
advantages for the firm.42 Furthermore, investors and shareholders 
typically have a strong understanding of the relationship between 
companies and the regulatory systems in which they operate.43 By 
relocating headquarters overseas, the MNC commits to laws and 
regulations of the new host country and potentially benefits from host 
country’s improved legal and regulatory regime, thereby sending signals 
to investors that it is operating under certain standards of governance.44 
The signal sent to investors when a firm establishes headquarters or 
remains established in the United States is that the firm is operating 
under increasingly heavy regulatory burdens and costs that restrict 
flexibility, consume valuable time and resources, and reduce potential 
return. 
b. Simplicity and Certainty in the Tax Law 
Where a tax system lacks simplicity, is ambiguous, or is inconsistent, 
neither the government nor its taxpayers can effectively plan and budget 
in accordance with their goals. Certainty in the law, or lack thereof, can 
significantly affect a taxpayer’s decision-making in several ways.45 The 
ability to predict, or at least roughly estimate, tax liability can contribute 
to more rational choices in transactions, whereas uncertainty can 
 
 40. A.M. Goyal, Impact of Capital Structure on Performance of Listed Public Sector Banks in 
India, 2 INT’L J. BUS. & MGMT. INVENTION 35, 35 (2013). 
 41. The Impact of International Tax Reform on U.S. Competitiveness: Hearing on H.R. 25, S, 
1050, and H.R. 2060 Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. On Ways 
and Means, 109th Cong. 6 (2006) (statement of Glenn Hubbard, Dean of Columbia Bus. Sch. and 
former Chair of the President’s Council of Econ. Advisers). 
 42. See Julian Birkinshaw et al., Why Do Some Multinational Corporations Relocate Their 
Headquarters Overseas?, 27 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 681, 684 (2006) (discussing MNC locational choices 
as a function of “firm-specific advantages” and “country-specific advantages”). 
 43. Gregory Day, Irrational Investors and the Corporate Inversion Puzzle, 69 SMU L. REV. 453, 
487 (2016). 
 44. MIKE W. PENG, GLOBAL STRATEGY 315 (2d ed. 2009). 
 45. JASON PIPER, ASS’N CHARTERED CERTIFIED ACCOUNTANTS, CERTAINTY IN TAX 3 (2014), 
http://www.accaglobal.com/content/dam/acca/global/PDF-technical/tax-publications/tech-tp-cit.pdf. 
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influence decisions on whether to pursue or continue a business or 
activity, based solely on the fear of harsh tax consequences.46 
A firm’s decision of whether and where to invest is complex, and will 
vary based on the specific goals and needs of the firm. The tax cost of 
being a U.S. company is undoubtedly high, but it is not the only factor 
taken into consideration when determining corporate location. While tax 
incentives influence decisions on corporate location, “[t]ransparency, 
simplicity, stability and certainty in the application of the tax law and [in] 
tax administration” generally bear greater weight than tax incentives.47 
Surveys examining firm decision making with respect to tax jurisdiction 
have found that tax incentives can actually be a discouraging feature of 
a jurisdiction where the rules are difficult to track, understand or comply 
with, because such complexity tends to increase costs to firm activity and 
limit growth.48 Because instability and unpredictability in a tax system 
add risk and create excessive burden that consumes firm resources, these 
factors are considered key in a firm’s decision on where to locate its 
headquarters and invest.49 Thus, while the higher total tax liability a 
company faces under the U.S. tax system certainly factors into the 
decision to relocate, the unpredictability and complexity of the tax 
administration in the United States has an important influence on a 
firm’s decision to relocate as well. 
2.   The Volume and Complexity of the U.S. Tax Code and 
Regulations 
Most people get the short version of U.S. corporate tax law: a thirty 
-five percent corporate tax on worldwide profits. But the law that gives 
us that information is notorious for its length and complexity. By the end 
of 2015, the U.S. Tax Code contained just under 2.5 million words, while 
federal tax regulations contained over 7.6 million words.50 This figure 
excludes the large body of case law to which taxpayers must also 
comply.51 The October 2016 preamble and regulations to Section 385 of 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., Tax Incentives for Investment: A Global Perspective 
Experiences in MENA and Non-MENA Countries, in MAKING REFORMS SUCCEED: MOVING FORWARD 
WITH THE MENA INVESTMENT POLICY AGENDA 225, 229 (2008). 
 48. Id. at 228–29. 
 49. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. ET AL., SOUTH EAST EUROPE REGION: 
ENTERPRISE POLICY PERFORMANCE A REGIONAL ASSESSMENT, OECD AND EUR. BANK FOR 
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV. 34–35 (2003) (analyzing key factors prompting firms’ location decisions 
in the context of South East Europe). 
 50. Scott Greenberg, Federal Tax Laws and Regulations Are Now Over 10 Million Words Long, 
TAX FOUND. (Oct. 8, 2015), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/federal-tax-laws-and-regulations-are-now-
over-10-million-words-long. 
 51. Id. 
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the Code span over 500 pages long.52 For large MNCs, the complexity of 
the U.S. tax rules requires a great amount of resources just for 
compliance. For example, Mobil Corporation once brought its federal tax 
documents to a congressional hearing to demonstrate the extent of its 
compliance burden.53 The documents totaled 6300 pages and weighed 
seventy-six pounds.54 And, in multiple years, Citigroup’s tax returns have 
exceeded 30,000 pages.55 
To complicate things further, each year there are changes or 
additions, requiring corporate taxpayers to track the changes and adapt 
with each new layer of rules. The rules become increasingly complex for 
firms with operations in more than one jurisdiction. 
Businesses hire accountants, lawyers and tax professionals to help 
them navigate the Code and to prepare, file, and pay their taxes. When it 
comes to MNCs, more advanced legal and accounting services are 
typically required, including tax legal counsel; tax accounting counsel; 
transfer pricing consulting; certain technology systems to maintain a 
broader range of detailed records; corporate planning, financial planning 
and forecasting professionals; and other miscellaneous costs.56 
3.   The Burdens Associated With Doing Business Under U.S. Tax 
Law 
The cost of compliance usually refers to all tax-related costs other 
than the actual taxes paid.57 The core legal costs include time costs, such 
as the time spent maintaining books and receipts; cash outlays related to 
tax obligations; purchases of tax-related software or publications; and 
payments to others, such as tax lawyers and accountants.58 The major 
activities involved in tax compliance can include maintaining accounting 
data; filing returns; planning and strategy to reduce liability; audits, 
appeals and dispute proceedings; and, possibly, tax penalties and 
prosecution proceedings, to name a few.59 Aside from these direct costs, 
businesses may incur indirect costs, such as delayed tax refunds that 
 
 52. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385 (2016). 
 53. Chris Edwards, Simplifying Federal Taxes: The Advantages of Consumption-Based 
Taxation, 416 POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 5 (2001). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, HOW THE PROPOSED SECTION 385 REGULATIONS COULD IMPACT 
CORPORATE TREASURY 17 (2016), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/risk-management/assets/ 
how-the-proposed-section-385-regulations-could-impact-corporate-treasury.pdf. 
 57. INV. CLIMATE ADVISORY SERVS. OF THE WORLD BANK GRP., A HANDBOOK FOR TAX SIMPLIFICATION 
34 (2009). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 36. 
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reduce the present value of the net cash flow of the business.60 Certain 
indirect costs are less quantifiable, such as the costs of ambiguous 
guidelines or rates, which change firm behavior.61 
From a leadership perspective, inversion can be attractive as a way 
to limit these costs by reducing the corporate management’s duty to 
comply with difficult regulations.62 While the corporate tax rate imposes 
high cost burdens, the corporate tax regulations in the United States 
impose not just financial burdens, but also consume a significant amount 
of time and effort. As the complexities within the tax regulations continue 
to multiply, the costs of doing business increase as well. The ongoing 
compliance requirements and uncertainties arising from the changing 
regulatory scheme result in the need to keep a number of highly qualified 
tax professionals employed so that a firm can adapt to unexpected 
changes. For example, Citigroup, a Delaware corporation, employed 
approximately 30,000 regulatory and tax compliance staff in 2015, as 
compared to approximately 14,000 in 2008, with compliance costs as 
high as $4.4 billion in a given year.63 
In a 2013 case study using data compiled by the World Bank, 
analysts considered 166 different economies using three indicators to 
measure a tax system’s administrative burden on businesses.64 In 2013, 
the United States averaged approximately 175 hours to comply with 
federal taxes per entity.65 Compare this figure to the averages of 59 hours 
in Luxembourg, 63 hours in Switzerland, and 80 hours in Ireland for the 
same year.66 Most countries saw a decline in the number of hours needed 
to comply in the years following 2013.67 However, the U.S. remained at 
175 hours through 2015, which is only slightly lower than the 187-hour 
average in the four years prior to 2013.68 
It also costs American companies significantly more to compute 
their U.S. tax on foreign income than to compute their U.S. tax on 
domestic income.69 For U.S. MNCs, foreign activities have accounted for 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Day, supra note 43, at 457.  
 63. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 10-K CITIGROUP INC. ANNUAL REPORT 62 ( Jan. 15, 2016). 
 64. Andrew Sentance, An Economic Analysis: Taxation, Economic Growth and Investment, in 
PAYING TAXES 2013: THE GLOBAL PICTURE 23, 25 (2013), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/ 
paying-taxes/assets/pwc-paying-taxes-2013-full-report.pdf (comparing the total tax rate as a 
percentage of profits; the number of different payments which businesses are required to deal with; 
and the time spent by businesses in complying with the tax laws). 
 65. Id. at 118 Fig.2.48. 
 66. Id. at 16 Fig. 1.3, 98 Fig. 2.38.  
 67. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS & WORLD BANK GRP., PAYING TAXES 2015: THE GLOBAL PICTURE 116 
(2015), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/paying-taxes/pdf/pwc-paying-taxes-2015-high-resolution.pdf. 
 68. Id. 
 69. BUS. ROUNDTABLE, TAXATION OF AMERICAN COMPANIES IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE: A PRIMER 
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39 percent of costs incurred to comply with U.S. tax rules, even though 
the percentage of assets and employment located abroad was less than 
half of that.70 While some industries encounter greater compliance costs 
than others, the general finding in this area has been that part of a U.S. 
company’s disadvantaged status compared to foreign competitors is the 
costs of complying with the U.S. tax rules.71 
As the Treasury continues to impose even more costs to an even 
broader range of businesses in the U.S., relocating headquarters may 
begin to seem like the only way to remain profitable for firms with certain 
features. Having a multinational group owned beneath a U.S. 
corporation has become not only unappealing, but practically bad 
business if the goal of the corporation is to maximize value and operate 
in the best interests of its shareholders. 
4.   Post-Inversion Advantages to a Corporation 
The following examples illustrate how inversion can allow a 
company to substantially reduce its effective tax rate, increase its 
attractiveness for investment, and operate with the flexibility to improve 
and expand the business. 
a. Lower Effective Tax Rate 
As a very basic example of the potential for tax savings through 
inversion, imagine that U.S. Corporation, taxed at a thirty-five percent 
rate, has $90,000 income generated in the United States and $10,000 
from the Irish territory. Similarly, Irish Corporation, taxed at 12.5 
percent in Ireland, has $10,000 income from the U.S. and $90,000 from 
Ireland.72 
If there is no inversion, U.S. Corporation is taxed at thirty-five 
percent on both United States and Irish-source income. U.S. Corporation 
will have a tax liability of $35,000¾thirty-five percent multiplied by its 
income from both territories. Irish Corporation, however, will have a tax 
liability of $14,750¾thirty-five percent multiplied by the U.S. income of 
 
24 (2011). 
 70. Id.  
 71. Joel Slemrod, The (Compliance) Cost of Taxing Business 7–10 (Apr. 25, 2006) (unpublished 
research paper) (on file with Mimeo Uni. of Mich.), 
http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/jslemrod/pdf/cost_of_taxing_business.pdf; see also Martha 
Blumenthal & Joel B. Slemrod, The Compliance Cost of Taxing Foreign-Source Income: Its 
Magnitude, Determinants, and Policy Implications, 2 INT’L TAX PUB. FIN. 37 (1995) (finding that the 
compliance cost of taxing foreign-source income is about forty percent of total tax compliance costs to 
large U.S. corporations). 
 72. The structure of this example was adapted from James G. S. Yang, Corporate Inversions: 
Rules and Strategies, 43 J. CORP. TAX’N 3, 8 (May/June 2016). 
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$10,000, plus 12.5 percent multiplied by the Irish-source income of 
$90,000. The combined tax liability for the two corporations is $49,750. 
Alternatively, if inversion occurs and U.S. Corporation merges with 
Irish Corporation, then the total U.S. income of $100,000 ($90,000 plus 
$10,000) is always taxed at thirty-five percent, leaving a tax liability of 
$35,000. On the other hand, the total income from the Irish territory of 
$100,000 is always taxed at 12.5 percent, resulting in a tax liability of 
$12,500. Thus, the total tax liability on income from both territories after 
the inversion is $47,500. 
Because the foreign territory income is not subject to the higher U.S. 
tax rate, as the example illustrates, part of the tax savings from inversion 
comes from the lower tax rate on income from the foreign territory. 
Lowering the firm’s tax liability, however, is just one of the ways a firm 
can benefit from leaving the United States. Other factors encouraging the 
decision include the opportunity for earnings stripping; modest 
transactional costs, especially as compared to the costs of remaining in 
the United States; continued access to capital markets; market 
acceptance and eligibility for government contracts following the 
inversion; and the ability to avoid the deficiencies in the U.S. tax laws 
governing multinationals.73 
b. Examples of Post-Inversion Tax Savings 
A study released in late 2016 examining inverted companies from 
1983 to 2014 found that, in the aggregate, firms reduced their corporate 
tax liabilities between $16.9 billion and $25.3 billion through inversion.74 
This research further found that many shareholders experience a positive 
net benefit from inversion.75 
For example, Transocean, an oil drilling company, inverted to 
Switzerland in 1999 and reduced its tax rate by approximately 50 percent, 
saving more than $2 billion in taxes over a ten-year period.76 Similarly, 
Caterpillar, Inc., a Delaware construction equipment manufacturer, also 
relocated to Switzerland in 1999, saving approximately $2.4 billion in tax 
in the twelve years following its inversion.77 Many other inverted 
 
 73. John C. Hamlett, The Declining Allure of Being “American” and the Proliferation of 
Corporate Tax Inversions: A Critical Analysis of Regulatory Efforts to Curtail the Inversion Trend, 
93 WASH. U. L. REV. 767, 775 n.77 (2016). 
 74. Anton Babkin et al., Are Corporate Inversions Good for Shareholders?, J. FIN. ECON.  
26 (2016). 
 75. Id. at 23. 
 76. Mitchell Franklin et al., To Invert or Remain a U.S. Multinational: The Consequences Are the 
Question, 43 J. CORP. TAXATION 17, 19 (Nov./Dec., 2016). 
 77. Caterpillar’s Offshore Tax: Strategy: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. On 
Investigations Comm. on Homeland Security & Gov’t Affairs, 113th Cong. (Apr. 1, 2014) (statement of 
Sen. Levin, Chairman, S. Comm. on Investigations).  
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companies have experienced similar tax savings, including Burger King 
in 2014, with an estimated tax savings of $275 million in the three years 
following its inversion; and Medtronic, in the largest inversion deal so 
far, with expected savings large enough that its executives agreed to 
trigger the roughly $63 million in capital gains taxes as part of the 
transaction.78 
C. CORPORATE INVERSION AND CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 
Recent changes in international tax law are worth noting, as they 
affect a firm’s decision on whether or not to relocate.79 With the OECD’s 
2013 report on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”), a global action 
plan was initiated to address the perceived flaws in international tax law 
that have allowed MNCs to shift profits and avoid taxation.80 However, 
even taking into consideration the potential for upcoming changes to 
foreign countries’ domestic tax laws, which might decrease the appeal of 
relocating to a particular jurisdiction, the costs associated with 
remaining in the United States continue to outweigh those of relocating. 
1.   Inversion in the United Kingdom 
The previous tax system in the United Kingdom tells a familiar story. 
Prior to 2009, the U.K.¾like the U.S. now¾operated under a worldwide 
system and had a high corporate tax rate. In the early 1990s, the U.K. had 
a corporate tax rate of 33 percent and charged tax on global profits of 
U.K.-resident companies.81 In 2006, a decision issued by the European 
Court of Justice (“ECJ”) sparked a wave of corporate inversions out of 
the U.K.82 The ruling established that the U.K. could not impose its 
corporate tax on foreign subsidiaries of U.K. MNCs.83 Following this 
ruling, U.K. corporations began moving quickly to Ireland. 
After the U.K. saw many of its large corporations fleeing to Ireland, 
it reformed its corporate tax system in an attempt to stop the problem of 
inversion and become a more attractive jurisdiction for corporations. The 
 
 78. Franklin et al., supra note 76, at 20. 
 79. See supra notes 36-45. 
 80. See generally About the Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/ 
tax/beps/beps-about.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2017). 
 81. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: UNITED KINGDOM 2007 141 
(2007). 
 82. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 17, at 7. 
 83. See Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd., et al., v. Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue, 2006 E.C.R. I-07995. In Cadbury Schweppes, a corporate group, Cadbury Schweppes 
Overseas, had established two subsidiaries in Ireland so that profits related to the internal financing 
activities of the Cadbury Schweppes group would benefit from Ireland’s more favorable tax regime. 
The case called into question the Freedom of Establishment Clause, which the Court ultimately held 
could not be invoked in another European Union member state purely for tax purposes. See id. 
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U.K. (1) shifted from taxing worldwide profits to a territorial system, 
under which it applied the corporate income tax only to income earned 
within its borders; (2) lowered its corporate tax rate to 28 percent in 
2010, and then again to 21 percent in 2014; and (3) reformed its rules for 
controlled foreign corporations (“CFCs”) to tax overseas profits only 
where there was artificial reduction of U.K. tax, rather than taxing all 
profits of the CFC.84 Following the changes to the corporate tax system 
in the U.K. in 2009, many previously inverted companies returned to the 
U.K., and many previously U.S. headquartered companies followed.85 
The U.K.’s corporate inversion problem and subsequent tax reform 
is often used as a possible example for the United States to follow in 
dealing with its own inversion problem. Beyond the example of the U.K., 
the argument has been made multiple times for the United States to 
lower its corporate tax rate and switch to a territorial system. However, 
the United States has firmly resisted change in these areas, and continues 
to address its inversion problem primarily through the regulatory 
system. 
2.   The OECD, BEPS, and the European Commission 
One concern surrounding the U.S. corporate tax system and the 
inability to reverse the inversion trend is the level of competitiveness the 
United States offers its MNCs. Because most other countries offer 
considerably lower corporate tax rates, tax only income earned within a 
jurisdiction, and provide much simpler rules for businesses to navigate, 
there are obvious incentives for a corporation to relocate. But recent 
changes in international tax were initiated with the goal of limiting 
certain tax-avoidance practices like, for example, corporate inversion. 
Since the release of the OECD’s report and BEPS Action Plan, many 
of the OECD member countries have taken steps to enact changes to local 
tax laws, including new rules regarding CFCs, permanent establishment 
status, and transparency¾all which aim to support the OECD’s 
guidelines for creating a more clear and functional international tax 
landscape.86 These adjustments to the local tax laws of OECD countries 
have the potential to make it difficult for corporations to invert and shift 
profits overseas. In addition, the European Commission’s 
(“Commission”) recent decisions regarding its Member States’ provision 
 
 84. William McBride, Tax Reform in the UK Reversed the Tide of Corporate Tax Inversions, TAX 
FOUND. 4 (Oct. 2014). 
 85. See, e.g., Tom Bergin, Britain Becomes Haven for U.S. Companies Keen to Cut Tax Bills, 
REUTERS (June 8, 2014, 11:10 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-usa-tax-insight-
idUSKBN0EK0BF20140609. 
 86. See BNA, BEPS Tracker, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 11, 2016),  
http://0-taxandaccounting.bna.com.hopac.uchastings.edu/btac/T17302/beps_aqb.adp.  
WILSON-69.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/22/17  12:50 AM 
404 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:387 
 
of tax benefits to corporations offers another potential hurdle for 
companies seeking to invert and receive the same tax “deals” that have 
previously been available to other inverted corporations.87 
However, these changes are not enough to outweigh the burdens 
associated with incorporating or remaining incorporated in the United 
States. OECD members have been quick to participate in discussion, but 
slow to act. And the United States, on the other hand, is quick to issue 
punitive domestic measures that require businesses to change practices 
and adapt, without taking the time to reach the root of the inversion 
problem. Thus, even with the progress taken toward changing 
international tax laws, U.S. corporations continue to have a strong 
incentive to invert. 
a. OECD Members and Implementation of BEPS’ Actions 
A goal of the OECD in issuing the BEPS Action Plan is to coordinate 
domestic tax rules across borders so that international tax standards may 
keep pace with the changing global business environment.88 Akin to the 
U.S. regulations regarding related-party debt between multinational 
groups and location of headquarters is BEPS Action 4. Action 4 seeks to 
limit base erosion via interest deductions and other financial payments 
by focusing on third party, related party, and intragroup debt.89 
Tax rules in a jurisdiction can greatly influence debt transactions 
within multinational groups, as groups often use intragroup financing as 
a way to claim interest deductions and defer income.90 Additionally, the 
definition of a permanent establishment is important in determining 
whether a non-resident entity must pay income tax in another country.91 
While Actions 4 and 7, as well as other BEPS Actions, seek to address 
problems that have the potential to reduce inversion issues for the United 
States, the fact that the OECD is a global consortium with no 
implementation authority makes the guidelines set forth just that 
¾guidelines.92 Passage and enforcement of the Actions proposed by the 
 
 87. See Press Release, European Comm’n, State Aid: Ireland Gave Illegal Tax Benefits to Apple 
Worth Up to €13 Billion (Aug. 30, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2923_en.html. 
 88. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., EXPLANATORY STATEMENT: OECD/G20 BASE EROSION 
PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT 5 (2015), www.oecd.org/tax/beps-explanatory-statement-2015.pdf. 
 89. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., LIMIT BASE EROSION VIA INTEREST DEDUCTIONS AND 
OTHER FINANCIAL PAYMENTS, ACTION 4—2015 FINAL REPORT 11 (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/ 
9789262411176-en. 
 90. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 
PROJECT—2015 FINAL REPORTS, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 10, 13–14 (2015), http://www.oecd. 
org/ctp/beps-frequently-asked-questions.pdf. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Hamish Boland-Rudder, OECD’s Tax Crackdown Calls for Global Profit Reporting, INT’L 
CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.icij.org/blog/2014/ 
09/oecds-tax-crackdown-calls-global-profit-reporting/. 
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OECD are left to individual countries to implement domestically if, and 
as they choose. 
The primary countries to which U.S. corporations have typically 
relocated¾the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, and the U.K.¾have 
discussed making changes to their domestic laws regarding Actions 4 and 
7.93 As members of the OECD, this discussion is natural. But these 
jurisdictions still have a need and desire to attract investment. Because 
the BEPS Actions¾described as “best practice” or “common approach” 
¾are not minimum standards, it is not likely that there will be change in 
many areas, at least in the short term.94 The Irish government, for 
example, has expressed that it is completely committed to keeping its 
corporate tax rate of 12.5 percent and, while it is open to “playing fair[,]” 
it is also “playing to win.” 95 The Dutch government has also recognized 
the need to remain attractive to MNCs, stating that its broad 
participation exemption, lack of withholding tax on royalties and interest 
payments, and other advantages will remain unchanged.96 
The OECD, through the BEPS initiative, has provided some useful 
guidance and tools for tax authorities to use in addressing base erosion 
and profit shifting. But even if countries adopt the guidelines with full 
force¾which is highly unlikely and would require the rewriting of 
thousands of tax laws¾the U.S. problem of inversion does not pend 
solely on whether other countries become less desirable than they are 
currently, but rather on whether the United States becomes less costly 
and less burdensome to its corporate taxpayers. 
b. The European Commission and State-Aid Rulings 
The OECD is not the only force with the potential to spark change in 
international corporate tax practices. The Commission recently released 
rulings and initiated investigations on EU member states providing 
selective state aid to certain companies.97 For example, in July 2016, the 
 
 93. See generally DELOITTE, BEPS ACTIONS IMPLEMENTATION BY COUNTRY: LUXEMBOURG (Mar. 
2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-beps-actions 
-implementation-luxembourg.pdf; DELOITTE, BEPS ACTIONS IMPLEMENTATION BY COUNTRY: IRELAND 
(March 2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-beps 
-actions-implementation-ireland.pdf; DELOITTE, BEPS ACTIONS IMPLEMENTATION BY COUNTRY: 
LUXEMBOURG (March 2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/ 
Tax/dttl-tax-beps-actions-implementation-netherlands.pdf. 
 94. Louise Kelly, Ireland: An Attractive Location in a Post-BEPS World, 27 INT’L TAX REV.  
60 (2016). 
 95. Ireland Tax Alert: BEPS Consultation Process Launched, DELOITTE (May 27, 2014), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-alert-ireland-270514.pdf. 
 96. Tax Insights: Dutch Government Responds to Final BEPS Reports, PRICEWATERHOUSE 
COOPERS (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/tax-services/publications/insights/assets/ 
pwc-dutch-government-responds-to-final-beps-reports.pdf. 
 97. See ROBERT B. STACK, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY RELEASES WHITE PAPER ON 
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Commission issued a decision holding that Spain’s tax treatment of 
certain football clubs¾applying a special corporate tax rate¾constituted 
unlawful state aid.98 Again, in August 2016, the Commission ruled that 
Ireland gave illegal “tax benefits to Apple worth up to €13 billion” (or 
$14.5 billion).99 Over the past few years, the Commission has also 
initiated investigations into similar generous tax deals offered to MNCs. 
Note that deals between Luxembourg and Fiat, and between the 
Netherlands and Starbucks, have already been found unlawful.100 
However, the winners and losers of the Commission’s rulings are not 
exactly clear. While the countries to which the Commission has ordered 
companies to pay back taxes will benefit from the income, these 
governments want companies like Apple, Fiat, and Starbucks investing 
in their jurisdiction and there is concern that too much change will deter 
investment.101 As such, the Irish government has announced that it will 
seek to appeal the Commission’s Apple ruling, claiming that Ireland 
needs to “maintain the jobs [they] have and develop jobs for the 
future.”102 
The attitude of the Irish government is a perfect indicator that the 
domestic tax laws of other countries will not change to the extent needed 
to stop corporations from leaving the United States. While part of the 
appeal of inversion may be the tax opportunities in other jurisdictions, 
the crux of the problem is the inability for U.S. companies to manage the 
convoluted U.S. tax system and remain competitive. For instance, Irish 
Finance Minister Michael Noonan recently commented that Ireland has 
not sought out U.S. businesses, and that the U.S. needs to look to its own 
tax system, stating “[w]e don’t invite U.S. companies to come to Ireland 
on the basis of inversion and we don’t welcome them when they do, but 
under international law we cannot stop them . . . it is a matter for U.S. 
authorities to change the law[.]”103 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S RECENT STATE AID INVESTIGATIONS INTO TRANSFER PRICING RULINGS 4–5 
(Aug. 24, 2016). 
 98. Press Release, European Comm’n, State Aid: Commission Decides Spanish Professional 
Football Clubs Have to Pay Back Incompatible Aid, (July 4, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/ 
press-release_IP-16-2401_en. 
 99. Press Release, supra note 87. 
 100. Press Release, European Comm’n, Commission Decides Selective Tax Advantages for Fiat in 
Luxembourg and Starbucks in the Netherlands Are Illegal Under EU State Aid Rules (Oct. 21, 2015), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5880_en.htm. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Paul Hannon, Ireland to Appeal EU’s Apple Tax Ruling, WALL ST. J., (Sept. 2, 2016,  
1:58 PM) http://www.wsj.com/articles/ireland-appeals-eus-apple-tax-ruling-1472820356 (quoting 
Paschal Donohoe, Ireland’s Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform). 
 103. Holly Ellyatt, Here Are the Likely Winners and Losers from the Apple Tax Ruling, CNBC 
EUROPE NEWS (Aug. 31, 2016, 7:58 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/31/ 
heres-the-likely-winners-and-losers-from-the-apple-tax-ruling.html. 
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Foreign governments have benefited greatly from the U.S. tax 
system driving corporations out, as these firms bring with them jobs and 
innovation to their new corporate homes. Even given the potential of the 
BEPS Actions and the rulings by the Commission, governments will not 
be inclined to make their tax systems as undesirable as the U.S. system, 
and the United States would be mistaken to bet the solution to its 
inversion problem on the current posture of international tax laws. 
II.  THE UNITED STATES’ APPROACH: PUNITIVE  
ANTI-INVERSION REGULATIONS 
The historical approach of the United States in addressing inversion 
has resisted making changes to the corporate tax rate or the taxation of 
worldwide profits of U.S. MNCs. Rather, the Treasury has adopted a 
primarily punitive approach to addressing inversion by adding to the 
existing layers of regulations, complicating the day-to-day operations of 
businesses, and increasing the costs of remaining in the United States. 
This approach, as will later be examined in more detail, is contrary to the 
overall goal of the United States in keeping businesses within the 
jurisdiction for tax purposes. A potential consequence of the increasing 
costs of doing business in the United States is that corporations, which 
perhaps have never planned on engaging in inversion, may now consider 
doing so as the best option of remaining, or becoming, competitive. 
A. THE REGULATORY SYSTEM AND THE TREASURY’S PREVIOUS EFFORTS 
TO CURB INVERSION 
Inversion is nothing new, and the United States has struggled to find 
a balance between keeping and attracting corporations to the United 
States, and ensuring that corporations contribute a fair amount to the 
U.S. tax base. Previous attempts to stop corporate inversion allowed two 
main avenues to remain. First, the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 
(“Jobs Act”)¾which added Section 7874 to the Code and sought to stop 
inversions by denying certain tax benefits¾still allowed for a corporation 
to invert if it had substantial business operations in the country where 
the firm sought to relocate.104 Second, corporations could invert through 
merging with a foreign corporation if the percentage of ownership by the 
original U.S. stockholders was less than a certain amount after the 
transaction.105 Corporations continued to engage in inversions following 
the Jobs Act, and the Treasury responded by issuing multiple rounds of 
regulations that altered the ownership threshold, limited the benefits of 
 
 104. Jefferson P. VanderWolk, Inversions Under Section 7874 of the Internal Revenue Code: 
Flawed Legislation, Flawed Guidance, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. BUS. 699, 699 (2010). 
 105. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 17, at 1, 5. 
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inverting, and created harsher penalties for corporations engaging in 
these transactions.106 
1.   A History of Retaliatory Anti-Inversion Regulations 
a. 1980s and 1990s 
The international relocation of McDermott to Panama in 1983 began 
a three-decade long story of U.S. corporate inversions.107 The following 
decade saw the highly publicized inversion of Helen of Troy, a cosmetics 
company, which relocated to Bermuda in 1993.108 In response to the 
Helen of Troy inversion, in 1994 Treasury issued a set of regulations in 
which the U.S. target companies’ shareholders would be generally taxed 
(despite nonrecognition provisions) if (1) any more than fifty percent of 
the new parent company’s stock was received by the U.S. transferors in 
the transaction; (2) the foreign acquirer was not engaged in active foreign 
business for the prior three years; or if (3) the foreign acquirer was not 
worth at least as much as the U.S. target company.109 Following the 
regulations, Tyco International inverted in 1997 with a new corporate 
home in Bermuda, followed by Transocean inverting in 1999 with a new 
home in the Cayman Islands.110 
b. Early 2000s and Beyond 
In 2001 and 2002, Cooper Industries, Ingersoll Rand, and Nabor 
Industries all left their U.S. home to enjoy a zero percent corporate tax 
rate in Bermuda, followed by Noble Drilling in 2002 to the Cayman 
Islands.111 To address this growing trend in corporate relocation, 
Congress passed the Jobs Act, adding Section 7874 to the Code.112 
Although the goal of Section 7874 was to curb inversions, the trend 
continued throughout the following decade. From 2005 to 2015, the 
following companies engaged in inversions and reincorporation to  
low- or no-tax jurisdictions:113 
 
 106. See I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-8, I.R.B 2014-42; I.R.S. Notice 2015-79, 2014-9, I.R.B.  
2015-49; see also Press Release, supra note 34. 
 107. See Orsolya Kun, Corporate Inversions: The Interplay of Tax, Corporate, and Economic 
Implications, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 313, 315–16 (2004) (attributing McDermott’s relocation as “the first 
major restricting to attract significant attention from the IRS.”).  
 108. Radha Mohan, The Erosion of the States’ Tax Base—A Whopper of a Problem? An 
Examination of Possible Solutions to Corporate Inversions, 41 TAX MGMT. WKLY ST. TAX REP. (2014). 
 109. See Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)–3(c) (1995). 
 110. See Stuart Webber, Escaping the U.S. Tax System: From Corporate Inversions to  
Re-Domiciling, 63 TAX NOTES INT’L 273, 276 (2011). 
 111. Id. 
 112. VanderWolk, supra note 104 at 699. 
 113. The table data was compiled from the following source: Mider, supra note 4; EY, WORLDWIDE 
CORPORATE TAX GUIDE (2016). 
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Year U.S. Corporation New Country of 
Incorporation 
New 
Corporate 
Tax Rate 
2005 Lazard Bermuda 0% 
2007 Argonaut Group Bermuda 0% 
2007 Western Goldfields Canada 15% 
2009 Tim Hortons Canada 15% 
2009 Ensco United Kingdom 20% 
2009 Hungarian Telephone Denmark 22% 
2009 Altisource Portfolio 
Solutions 
Luxembourg 21% 
2010 Valeant Canada 15% 
2011 Alkermes Ireland 12.5% 
2012 Jazz Pharmaceuticals Ireland 12.5% 
2012 Aeon United Kingdom 20% 
2012 Rowan United Kingdom 20% 
2012 Tronox Australia 30% 
2012 DE Master Blenders 
1753 
Netherlands 25% 
2012 Eaton Ireland 12.5% 
2012 Stratasys Israel 25% 
2013 Tower Group Bermuda 0% 
2013 Liberty Global United Kingdom 20% 
2013  Actavis Ireland 12.5% 
2013 Perrigo Ireland 12.5% 
2014 Endo International Ireland 12.5% 
2014 Theravance Biopharma Cayman Islands 0% 
2014 Horizon Pharma Ireland 12.5% 
2014 Burger King Canada 15% 
2015 Medtronic Ireland 12.5% 
2015 Mylan Netherlands 25% 
2015 Civeo Canada 15% 
2015 Wright Medical Netherlands 25% 
2015 LivaNova United Kingdom 20% 
2015 Steris United Kingdom 20% 
 
In response to this rush of inversions, the Treasury released Notice 
2014-52 (“Notice”).114 This Notice addresses certain cross-border 
transactions that the IRS identified as facilitating inversions and 
 
 114. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces First Steps to Reduce 
Benefits of Corporate Inversions: Unfair Practice Erodes the U.S. Tax Base (Sept. 22, 2014), 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2647.aspx. 
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avoiding the application of Section 7874.115 The guidance within Notice 
2014-52 (1) disregarded certain stock of a foreign acquiring corporation 
holding a significant amount of passive assets; (2) disregarded certain 
non-ordinary course distributions by the U.S. company; (3) changed the 
treatment of certain transfers of stock of the foreign acquiring 
corporation; and (4) addressed post-transaction steps that the taxpayer 
may take with respect to U.S.-owned foreign subsidiaries.116 
Again, in November of 2015, the Treasury announced guidance that 
made it more difficult to engage in inversion and reduced the benefits of 
doing so. Notice 2015–79 expanded on the guidance from Notice  
2014-52 by (1) providing a “substantial business activities” test that must 
be satisfied if the foreign acquiring corporation is a tax resident in the 
foreign jurisdiction; (2) limiting the scope of where the new foreign 
parent company may be organized; and (3) clarifying previous 
regulations dealing with active business assets involved in the transfer.117 
Further, the 2015 Notice announced rules to decrease the tax benefits of 
inversion by expanding the scope of inversion gain to include certain 
income that cannot be offset by losses, and required that all unrealized 
built-in gain in CFC stock be recognized if the transaction terminates the 
status of the foreign subsidiary as a CFC.118 
c. 2016 Anti-Inversion Regulations 
On April 4, 2016, the Treasury issued temporary regulations further 
addressing inversion and earnings stripping.119 The April 2016 proposed 
regulations not only supported the guidance in the previous two notices 
regarding Section 7874 of the Code, but also targeted transactions that 
increase related-party debt that does not finance new investment in the 
U.S., relating to Code Section 385.120 
Immediately following the announcement and release of the 
proposed regulations in April 2016, U.S. businesses expressed concerns 
about the excessiveness of the proposed regulations in both their reach 
 
 115. See Internal Revenue Bulletin: Notice 2014-52, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Oct. 14, 2014). 
 116. Id. For purposes of Notice 2014-52, non-ordinary course distributions mean “the excess of all 
distributions made during a taxable year by the domestic entity with respect to its stock or partnership 
interests, as applicable, over 110 percent of the average of such distributions during the thirty-six 
month period immediately preceding such taxable year.” Id. 
 117. See I.R.S. Notice 2015-79 (discussing additional rules regarding inversions and related 
transactions).  
 118. Id. 
 119. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Treasury Issues Inversion Regulations and Proposed 
Earnings Stripping Regulations (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/jl0404.aspx. 
 120. Id. 
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and cost.121 In the six months following the release of the new rules, there 
were multiple estimates on how the proposed rules would impact the 
day-to-day operations of U.S. businesses, and much of the discussion 
stressed the impracticability of complying with the Treasury’s rules.122 As 
a result of much public comment on the proposed regulations under 
Section 385, the Treasury announced the final and temporary versions of 
the regulations in October 2016, which included certain exemptions from 
the earlier version of the rules.123 While the final version of the 
regulations exempts certain types of corporations that were included in 
the proposed rules, debt issued by these corporations will still have to 
meet the criteria set forth in the regulations, which required the same 
standards of compliance as noted under the proposed rules.124 Moreover, 
for the corporations to which the rules do apply, the final rules preserve 
the heavy compliance burden and the harsh consequences of  
re-characterization.125 Even with the exceptions provided by the final 
regulations, these rules still make it more expensive for companies to 
remain in the United States, thereby increasing the incentive to invert. 
B. THE SCOPE OF THE 2016 ANTI-INVERSION REGULATIONS 
As mentioned above, the proposed and final regulations announced 
in 2016 expand and provide guidance primarily on two sections of the 
Code: Section 7874 and Section 385. Section 7874 addresses the 
structure of transactions commonly used for inversion, and Section 385 
addresses whether the character of an interest in a corporation is treated 
as debt or equity for tax purposes.126 Before understanding how the 
proposed and final regulations under these sections will affect the costs 
of doing business for U.S. entities, it is helpful to briefly examine the 
mechanics of the regulations. 
1.   Certain Acquisition Transactions Under Regulations to Code 
Section 7874 
Section 7874 is the primary section governing inversion under the 
Code. Section 7874 generally applies to inversion transactions only if (1) 
the transaction includes an acquisition of a U.S. entity by a foreign 
 
 121. See Letter from Advanced Med. Tech. Ass’n Am. Chemistry Council et al., to Jacob Lew, U.S. 
Treas. Sec. (May 12, 2016) (on file with BusinessRoundtable.org). 
 122. See generally PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 56 (analyzing the impacts of proposed 
Section 385 regulations on corporate taxation). 
 123. Press Release, supra note 34. 
 124. Peter L. Faber, SALT Implications of Final Section 385 Debt-Equity Regulations, 
MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.mwe.com/en/thought-leadership/ 
publications/2016/10/salt-implications-debt-equity-regulations. 
 125. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385 (2016). 
 126. See I.R.C. § 7874 (2005); I.R.C. § 385 (2016). 
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acquiring entity; (2) the former shareholders of the acquired U.S. entity 
own at least sixty percent of the stock of the combined foreign acquiring 
entity following the acquisition; and (3) the foreign acquiring corporation 
does not have substantial business activities in its country of 
incorporation.127 More simply stated, whether or not Section 7874 
applies to the transaction rests primarily on the percentage of ownership 
of the foreign entity that is held by the U.S. entity shareholders and the 
substantiality of the business activities in the foreign country in which 
the entity is created.128 
One available alternative for companies to avoid the applicability of 
Section 7874 is to engage in a multiple-step acquisition, in which they 
cascade the increases in the value of the foreign acquiring corporation 
after each acquisition of a U.S. corporation, which allows for acquisitions 
of larger U.S. corporations without falling within the scope of the Section 
7874 rules.129 This strategy was the motivation for issuing the April 2016 
temporary regulations under Section 7874.130 In the “multiple-step 
acquisition,” or “serial inverter” rule, the Treasury targeted U.S. 
companies that acquire a foreign company that has a history of inversion 
itself.131 The rule applies to prior transactions that occur within a three-
year period, ending on the signing date of the relevant transaction.132 
When the multiple-step acquisition rule applies, the ownership ratios are 
adjusted so that the consequences of Section 7874 likely still apply.133 
 
 127. SIDLEY, NEW INVERSION REGULATIONS IMPLEMENT AND EXPAND THE SCOPE OF THE  
ANTI-INVERSION TAX RULES 1 (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.sidley.com/~/media/update-pdfs/2016/ 
04/20160407-tax-update.pdf. If the level of ownership after the transaction continues at somewhere 
between sixty percent and eighty percent of what the ownership was of the acquired U.S. entity, then 
Section 7874 imposes special gain recognition on the U.S. entity and any entities which are part of the 
“expanded affiliate group” (“EAG”) of the U.S. entity. See VanderWolk, supra 112, at 700 (analyzing 
the application of I.R.C. § 7874 (2005)). The term “expanded affiliate group” pertains to one or more 
chains of includible corporations connected through stock ownership with a common parent. I.R.C. 
§ 1504(a) (2014). The special gain (“inversion gain”) recognition on the U.S. entity and members of 
the EAG applies for ten years from the last date on which properties are acquired as part of the 
transaction. See I.R.C. § 7874(d)(1)(A) (2005). If the former shareholders of the acquired U.S. entity 
own at least eighty percent of the stock of the combined foreign acquiring entity following the 
acquisition, then the foreign corporation will be treated as a domestic corporation for tax purposes, 
thus denying the tax benefits of the transaction. I.R.C. § 7874(b) (2005). 
 128. See I.R.C. 7874. 
 129. SIDLEY, supra note 127. 
 130. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 119. 
 131. Jeffrey Zients & Seth Hanlon, The Corporate Inversions Tax Loophole: What You Need to 
Know, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Apr. 8, 2016, 6:39 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
blog/2016/04/08/corporate-inversions-tax-loophole-what-you-need-know. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
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2.   Rules Regarding the Treatment of Debt Under Code  
Section 385 
Under section 385 of the Code the Secretary has the authority to 
prescribe regulations “as may be necessary or appropriate to determine 
whether an interest in a corporation is treated as debt or equity for tax 
purposes.”134 The section provides factors, developed through case law, 
to be taken into account in determining “whether a debtor-creditor 
relationship exists or a corporation-shareholder relationship exists.135 
a. The Existing Rules and the Importance of the  
Debt/Equity Distinction 
Corporations typically prefer debt, rather than equity, because of the 
way U.S. tax law¾as well as other jurisdictions¾has traditionally treated 
debt for tax purposes.136 The different tax treatment of debt and equity is 
most important to an issuing corporation with regard to the deductibility 
of current payments (either interest or distributions) made on debt or 
equity.137 Because the Code provides this divergent treatment of debt and 
equity, corporate taxpayers often structure transactions in a way that 
treats an instrument as debt if there is no pressing non-tax reason for 
classifying the instrument as equity.138 
In addition to the preference for debt financing under most tax 
regimes, the use of internal debt within a multinational group leads to 
important cost savings and increased flexibility.139 For U.S. multinational 
groups in particular, internal market activity reflects firm reaction to 
expensive and uncontrollable features of the external market.140 Due to 
 
 134. I.R.C. § 385(a) (2016). 
 135. Id. at (b). These factors include whether there is a written agreement for repayment 
accompanied by interest; whether there is subordination to or preference over any other debt of the 
corporation; the ratio of debt to equity of the corporation; and the option of convertibility of the debt 
into equity. Id. at (b)(1)–(5). 
 136. See I.R.C. § 163(a) (2015). First, the Code allows businesses a deduction for interest paid on a 
debt, which can be taken against both ordinary and capital gain income to the business. Equity, 
however, is treated much differently under the Code. Section 163(a) allows a deduction for “all interest 
paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness,” but no such deduction is allowed for 
distributions to the corporation’s shareholders. Id. A corporation may not recognize any loss or 
deduction on the distribution of dividends or on the repurchase of stock. See I.R.C. § 311. Dividends, 
therefore, are paid out of after-tax income and are typically subject to multiple levels of tax. Harry 
Huizinga, Luc Laeven & Gaëtan Nicodème, Capital Structure and International Debt Shifting (Eur. 
Comm’n. Working Paper No. 263, 1, 2 2006). 
 137. William M. Gentry & R. Glenn Hubbard, Fundamental Tax Reform and Corporate Financial 
Policy, 12 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 191, 196–97 (1998). 
 138. See, e.g., United States v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 133 F.2d 990, 993 (6th Cir. 1943). 
 139. Nico Dewaelheyns & Cynthia Van Hulle, Internal Capital Markets and Capital Structure: 
Bank Versus Internal Debt, 16 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 345, 351 (2010). 
 140. Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley, & James R. Hines Jr., The Internal Markets of Multinational 
Firms, 87 SURV. CURRENT BUS. 42, 42 (2007). 
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the tax treatment, as well as the non-tax benefits of this type of financing, 
internal debt has become a key feature of multinational corporations.141 
b. Proposed, Temporary, and Final Changes Under the 2016 
Section 385 Regulations 
When the Treasury issued the April 2016 proposed regulations 
under Section 385, it added rules regarding the criteria for treating an 
interest as debt or equity for tax purposes.142 Prior to the proposed and 
final regulations, a U.S. subsidiary could issue debt to its foreign parent 
as a dividend distribution following an inversion, and the foreign parent 
could then transfer that debt to a related foreign entity in a low-tax 
jurisdiction.143 In turn, the U.S. subsidiary was able to deduct the 
subsequent interest paid to the related foreign affiliate.144 Because this 
type of transaction is one of the benefits to a firm after inversion, the 
Treasury’s goal in issuing the proposed regulations under Section 385 
was to reduce the post-inversion benefits available to the entire group.145 
In the six months between the announcement of the April 2016 
proposed regulations and the release of the October 2016 final 
regulations, the Treasury made a number of changes to the scope and 
application of the rules regarding the treatment of debt.146 Due to the 
excessive burdens estimated under the proposed regulations and the 
criticism received by the Treasury thereafter, the final regulations were 
created with a number of revisions to the April 2016 proposed rules.147 
Most notably, the final regulations relaxed the timing and scope of the 
documentation requirements; reserved application to debt instruments 
issued by a foreign corporation to a foreign corporation in a group; 
provided guidance on satisfying the documentation requirements with 
regards to cash pooling and other internal financing arrangements; 
removed the proposed bifurcation rule, under which the Treasury could 
treat an instrument as part-debt and part-equity; and created exclusions 
for S corporations and other certain tax-exempt entities.148 
 
 141. Thiess Buettner, Michael Overesch, & Georg Wamser, Restricted Interest Deductibility and 
Multinationals’ Use of Internal Debt Finance, 23 INT’L TAX PUB. FIN. 785, 787 (2016). 
 142. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 119. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See Press Release, supra note 34 (discussing “regulations to address earnings stripping.”). 
 147. Id. 
 148. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385 (2016). Under the April 2016 proposed regulations, the Treasury 
required debt instruments to be substantiated within 30 days of issuance; applied to all members of 
an EAG, including foreign corporations with no U.S. tax relevancy; applied generally to all related 
party debt, including cash pooling; and applied to S corporations and certain tax-exempt entities. 
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-2(b)(3), 81 Fed. Reg. 20912, 20919–21 (Apr. 8, 2016). 
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First, under the proposed regulations, if debt was issued by a foreign 
parent company to a U.S. subsidiary, then the rules treated the 
instrument as equity, thereby denying any deduction to the U.S. 
subsidiary on interest payments to the foreign parent.149 If the debt is 
treated as equity for U.S. tax purposes, then the interest payments on the 
debt would be treated as dividends subject to outbound withholding tax 
at whatever rate is provided by the applicable income tax treaty with the 
foreign parent’s jurisdiction.150 In the final version of the section 385 
regulations, however, the Treasury withdrew its application of this 
treatment to foreign issuers.151 Thus, the final rules extend to debt 
instruments issued by members of a group that are domestic 
corporations.152 
Second, the documentation corporate taxpayers must prepare and 
maintain to substantiate an interest as debt, rather than equity, generally 
applies to an “expanded affiliate group” (“EAG”).153 The proposed and 
final regulations broadened the definition of EAG to include foreign and 
tax-exempt corporations, as well as certain corporations held 
indirectly.154 Further, if the section 385 regulations apply to an entity 
based on these criteria, then the entity will be required to comply with 
documentation and reporting requirements for any debt instruments 
issued by a member of an EAG to another member of the EAG.155 If the 
 
 149. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-2(b)(3), 81 Fed. Reg. 20912, 20919–21. 
 150. David P. Hariton, U.S. Taxation of Related Party Debt: New Proposed Regulations, HARV. L. 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE FIN. REG. (Apr. 20, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/ 
2016/04/20/u-s-taxation-of-related-party-debt-new-proposed-regulations. 
 151. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-1. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-1, 81 Fed. Reg. 20912, 20919 (Apr. 8, 2016). This section uses the 
definition of “affiliate group” from Code section 1504. An “affiliate group” under section 1504(a) is one 
or more chains of includible corporations connected through stock ownership with a common parent 
corporation. See I.R.C. § 1504(a) (2014). The stock ownership test under this section requires that the 
common parent owns directly at least fifty percent stock of at least one of the other includible 
corporations, and that stock meeting the fifty percent requirement is owned directly by one or more of 
the includible corporations. Id. For example, if FC, a foreign corporation, owns more than fifty percent 
of the stock of DC, a domestic corporation that owns more than fifty percent of the stock of DS, another 
domestic corporation, then FC, DC, and DS make up an EAG. Under the definition in section 1504, 
however, foreign corporations and tax-exempt corporations are excluded from the term “includible 
corporation.” Id. § 1504(b). 
 154. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-1, 81 Fed. Reg. 20912, 20919 (Apr., 8, 2016). In the April 2016 
proposed regulations, the term “expanded affiliate group” applied also to S corporations, regulated 
investment companies and real estate investment trusts, and partnerships; Treas. Reg.  
§ 1.385-B(2)(b). In final version of the regulations released in October 2016, the Treasury modified the 
expanded definition of an EAG to exclude S corporations, regulated investment companies, and real 
estate investment trusts, and provided a partial exemption for certain partnerships. 
 155. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-2, 81 Fed. Reg. 20912, 20929 (Apr. 8, 2016); Treas. Reg. § 1.385-2 
(2017) (Under the April proposed regulations, these requirements must have been satisfied within 
thirty days of the issuance of the instrument between the group, or result in being automatically 
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documentation requirements are not met or fail to establish the 
characteristics of debt, the instrument risks reclassification as equity, 
therefore losing any deduction.156 However, even if the documentation 
requirements are satisfied, the instrument is not certain to remain 
characterized as debt, and is subject to re-characterization if the Treasury 
later determines so.157 
Another widely contested rule in the proposed regulations was the 
“Funding Rule,” which generally provided that debt issued in connection 
with certain stock transactions would be treated as equity if it was issued 
within three years before, or three years after, the transaction.158 This 
application to transactions within a six-year range received much public 
comment under the proposed regulations.159 A major concern under the 
Funding Rule was the cascading effect of the recharacterization of debt, 
whereby the recharacterization of one transaction as equity would trigger 
the recharacterization of another within the six-year period, and so on. 
The final rules, in response to comments received, offered limited relief 
from the duplicating effect of the proposed rules by providing that once 
a covered instrument is recharacterized under the Funding Rule, the 
transaction that caused said recharacterization cannot cause the 
recharacterization of another debt instrument after the first instrument 
is repaid.160 This limitation still allows for a cascading effect, however, it 
limits the potentially vast number of chains of reclassification that can be 
initiated by a single transaction. 
While the rules in the final regulations offer relief from some of the 
excessive burdens of the proposed rules for certain companies, they 
preserve the harsh consequences for the companies to which they still 
apply. These regulations add punitive consequences to ordinary 
transactions, increase the cost of compliance, decrease the flexibility of 
corporate financing activities, and provide uncertainty to companies 
operating under them. 
 
treated as equity. However, the October 2016 final regulations modified this rule, giving the taxpayer 
until the time of filing to complete the documentation). 
 156. Treasury Reg. § 1.385-2. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3, 81 Fed. Reg. 20912, 20922. Specifically, the transactions that 
trigger recharacterization include any distribution on stock, in exchange for stock of any member of 
the EAG, or as “boot” in an internal asset reorganization. Id. “Boot” refers to certain “nonqualified 
preferred stock” under Code Section 351(g)(2), which is certain preferred stock with debt-like 
characteristics. STEPHEN SHWARZ & DANIEL J. LATHROPE, FUNDAMENTALS OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 
TAXATION 457 (Found. Press 5th ed. 2012). 
 159. See, e.g., Letter from Advanced Med. Tech. Ass’n Am. Chemistry Council et al., supra note 121 
(This letter, on behalf of twenty-three U.S. corporations to Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew, expressed 
the burdens and costs the new rules would place on continuing to do business in the U.S.). 
 160. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(6) (2017). 
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C. THE ADDED COSTS AND BURDENS UNDER THE 2016 ANTI-INVERSION 
RULES 
The new rules set forth in the 2016 anti-inversion regulations will 
further increase the costs of doing business in the U.S. and further 
disadvantage U.S. businesses as compared to their foreign competitors, 
thereby increasing the incentive for inversion. Because the  
re-characterization rules and documentation requirements increase the 
cost of daily operations and planning, in addition to lost deductions, the 
costs associated with compliance may outweigh those of inversion for 
certain companies. Further, the drastic changes to such a critical aspect 
of corporate finance within such a short timeframe have created concern 
and confusion as to what the appropriate standards are, how they can be 
met, and what other essential business practices are at risk of 
experiencing the same changes in treatment.161 
While the revisions under the final Section 385 regulations are an 
improvement over the April 2016 proposed rules, the issue of 
reclassifying a debt instrument as equity is still a major concern for the 
firms to which the final regulations do apply. Moreover, the compliance 
burden extends to even those entities that are exempted from the  
re-characterization rules. The final regulations preserve the significant 
consequences for noncompliance and impact a large number of internal 
financing, reorganization, and ordinary course transactions.162 
 
1.   The Risk of Re-characterization and Lost Deductions 
The re-characterization rule in the final regulations will recast debt 
as equity if a member of an EAG issues the instrument in a “tainted” 
transaction to another member of the EAG, and if the instrument is 
deemed to have funded the transaction.163 For example, consider a 
foreign parent that has a U.S. subsidiary seeking to expand in the United 
States with a loan financed by the parent company. The parent company 
finances the expansion, loaning $200 million to its subsidiary, which was 
borrowed from a foreign bank in the country where the parent company 
 
 161. See Philip R. Hirschfeld & Stanley C. Ruchelman, Uproar over Proposed § 385 Regulations: 
Will Treasury Delay Adoption?, 3 RUCHELMAN INSIGHTS 40 (2016), http://publications.ruchelaw. 
com/news/2016-09/Code-385-pushback.pdf. 
 162. Grant Thornton, Treasury Finalizes and Significantly Modifies the Debt-Equity Regulations 
Under Section 385 (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.grantthornton.com/issues/library/alerts/tax/ 
2016/Flash/treasury-modifies-debt-equity-regulations.aspx. 
 163. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3 (2017). (A “tainted” transaction within the meaning of the 385 
regulations includes, generally, “a distribution to shareholders; acquisition of an EAG member in an 
asset reorganization with boot; and acquiring stock of another EAG member in exchange for 
property”); KPMG, Section 385 Final Regulations: Initial Reactions (Oct. 14, 2016), 
https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2016/10/16460v5.pdf. 
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is located. The parent is able to use its worldwide assets as collateral, 
while the U.S. subsidiary is only able to use its own assets. Therefore, the 
parent company has the ability to borrow on better terms.164 Assume the 
parent company borrowed the $200 million from a bank for 20 years at 
a three percent interest rate and that the U.S. subsidiary took the loan 
from the parent with a twenty-year term and a four percent interest rate. 
Prior to the regulations, the U.S. subsidiary would have been able to 
deduct $8 million per year for interest paid on its debt to the parent.165 
Assuming the affiliate group meets the criteria for application of the 
regulations, and that the earnings and profits of the entities are such that 
the section 385 regulations are triggered by this transaction, the  
$8 million of annual interest payments on the loan would be 
recharacterized as dividends to the parent, and is therefore not 
deductible.166 
2.   The Increased Costs of External Borrowing 
If the companies in the above example want to avoid this risk of 
recharacterization, then the U.S. subsidiary can borrow directly from a 
bank, likely with less desirable loan terms. In addition, the parent 
company would lose $2 million in net income from the difference 
between the lower interest it paid on the loan to the bank ($6 million) 
and the higher interest payments received by the U.S. subsidiary ($8 
million). Further, the subsidiary borrower would make interest payments 
charged at a higher rate, and thus the cost of borrowing would increase 
to above $8 million, depending on the rate offered by the third party 
lender. 
Subsidiaries of MNCs rely heavily on these types of loans from 
parent corporations or related parties to finance a broad range of 
business activities.167 Because of the limitations placed on the use of cash 
between related entities under the section 385 regulations, companies to 
which the regulations apply may need to increase the use of third party 
financing to fund business activities traditionally funded through 
internal financing. This limited ability to use internal cash to fund 
business activities, as the above example illustrates, will potentially 
 
 164. See Senay Agca et al., Financial Reforms, Financial Openness, and Corporate Borrowing: 
International Evidence 12 (IMF Working Paper, 2007), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1007935 
(explaining that larger firms with more assets are able to borrow at more favorable terms because they 
are able to offer the lender more verifiable collateral). 
 165. See I.R.C. § 163(a) (2015). 
 166. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3. 
 167. Bhagwan Chowdhry & Vikram Nanda, Financing of Multinational Subsidiaries: Parent Debt 
vs. External Debt, 4 J. OF CORP. FIN. 87, 88 (1998). 
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increase the cost of capital, thereby reducing the appeal of business 
investments.168 
3.   The Increased Compliance Burden 
In addition to increasing the cost of capital, the documentation 
requirements under the proposed Section 385 regulations were the 
primary concerns raised in the nearly 200 comment letters received by 
the Treasury and IRS between April and October 2016.169 While the 
October 2016 final regulations reduced the transactions and entities to 
which the rules apply, companies still need to implement and maintain 
systems of documentation that can support the character of transactions 
and meet the requirements under the regulations if they wish to keep an 
instrument classified as debt. 
a. Compliance Complications for Certain Ordinary Course 
Transactions 
One area where the proposed regulations would have been 
particularly burdensome was the application of the rules to common 
forms of intercompany financing, specifically a practice known as “cash 
pooling.” Cash pooling involves multiple affiliates that “pool” excess 
funds together and make those funds available to affiliates that need it.170 
The excess funds that are pooled together from the affiliates are usually 
transferred from each affiliate’s account and deposited into one “pool” 
account, which is typically recorded as a loan to the cash pooling 
account.171 
The proposed rules under section 385 were not particularly clear on 
how the documentation rules applied to arrangements like cash pooling 
or revolving credit arrangements, which are not generally documented 
by any separate legal agreement.172 The final regulations make clear that 
 
 168. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 56. 
 169. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, STATE TAX IMPLICATIONS OF NEWLY RELEASED IRC SECTION 385 
REGULATIONS, TAX INSIGHTS 1 (2016), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/state-local-tax/newsletters/ 
salt-insights/assets/pwc-state-tax-uncertainty-continues-under-new-section-385-regulations.pdf. 
 170. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF PROPOSED SECTION 385 REGULATIONS: 
INBOUND AND OUTBOUND EXAMPLES, 4, 8 (2016). 
 171. See id. at 4. For example, suppose you have Parent Corp., a U.S. parent of a multinational 
group owning all stock of four foreign subsidiaries: 1, 2, 3, and Pool Corp. (together, with Parent Corp., 
“U.S. Group”). Foreign subsidiaries 1, 2, and 3 are all operating corporations and Pool Corp. is the 
group’s cash pool leader. When subsidiaries 1, 2, and 3 have excess funds, they deposit those funds to 
Pool Corp. into the cash pool. If foreign subsidiaries 1, 2, or 3 need extra funds, then the corporation 
will borrow those funds from Pool Corp. rather than obtaining external financing from a bank or other 
third party. Id. at 9.  
 172. SKADDEN TAX GRP., IRS AND TREASURY ISSUE FINAL DEBT/EQUITY REGULATIONS (2016), 
https://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/IRS_and_Treasury_Issue_Final_Debt_
Equity_Regulations.pdf. 
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the documentation rules apply not only to instruments issued in the legal 
form of debt, but also to various similar transactions that are not typically 
supported by a separate agreement, including revolving credit 
agreements and cash pooling arrangements.173 
The final Section 385 regulations provide an exception from the 
recharacterization rule, however, for certain short-term debt and cash 
pooling arrangements, given that the instrument satisfies one of two 
tests.174 So while certain arrangements will not be subject to 
recharacterization, they will still need to comply with the documentation 
requirements. While these exceptions were issued with the intent of 
relieving businesses of some of the burdensome consequences to 
ordinary course transactions, the rules remain complex and potentially 
difficult to administer.175 
b. Estimated Costs of Compliance Under the Section 385 
Regulations 
Accompanying the announcement of the proposed regulations in 
April 2016, the Treasury provided a Regulatory Impact Analysis 
including estimated costs of documentation and compliance under the 
proposed regulations.176 The Treasury’s estimate for the annual 
“paperwork burden associated with the proposed regulations” for 
substantiation of related party debt was approximately $13 million for all 
companies annually.177 The government estimated that the total number 
of entities to which the proposed regulations would apply was 21,000; 
estimated that annual reporting burden per entity would have been 35 
hours; and estimated that the total reporting burden to all entities 
complying with the proposed regulations would have been 735,000 
 
 173. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-2(3)(i)(A) (2017). 
 174. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(c)(i) (2017). Under the “current assets test,” (1) the interest 
rate must be no greater than an arm’s length rate, and (2) immediately after the issuance, the issuer’s 
balance of expanded group debt, which meets one of four criteria, cannot exceed the issuer’s  
“short-term financing needs” during the course of the normal operating cycle. Id. The second test is 
the “270-day test,” which is generally met if the debt instrument has a term of 270 days or less; bears 
an arm’s length interest rate; and where the issuer is not a net borrower for more than 270 days during 
the taxable year or 270 consecutive days across taxable years; or where the issuer is a not a net 
borrower from any other member of the group for 270 days of the year. Id. 
 175. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 170, at 8. If these transactions are completed at 
the end of each day, or even each week, with multiple members within a cash pool, then meeting the 
documentation requirements under the section 385 regulations could potentially require the formal 
documentation of hundreds of transactions each day, which is currently not the common practice with 
these types of arrangements. Id.  
 176. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (2016), https://www.regulations. 
gov/document?D=IRS-2016-0014-0001. 
 177. Id. 
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hours.178 Taking the government’s estimate with a total annual cost of $13 
million and dividing it by the estimated 735,000 hours, the estimate 
implies an average cost of labor at $18 per hour. The government’s 
estimate¾when taking into consideration the current standards of 
compliance and the need to implement new compliance systems; the 
hourly costs of legal, tax, and other professionals needed to advise on and 
structure a system; the number of companies to which the regulations 
apply; and the amount of related party debt within those companies—
seems optimistically and unrealistically low.179 
Other estimates predicted that the costs associated with complying 
with the proposed regulations would be much higher. In July 2016, PwC 
released a report analyzing the proposed regulations and the potential 
costs of compliance for Fortune 100 companies.180 The analysis took into 
consideration both the initial startup costs of implementing the new 
compliance systems and the ongoing operational costs thereafter.181 In 
start-up costs, the report includes fees relating to legal, accounting, 
financial planning and forecasting, tax, and even human resources.182 In 
total, the report estimated that the number of hours needed to design 
such a compliance system would require approximately 21,600 hours 
between the cost items listed.183 The report pulled statistics from the 
Department of Labor for wages associated with each of the cost items, 
multiplying the associated wages by the estimated hours needed for each 
item.184 In the year of implementation alone, for just the Fortune 100 
companies, the total estimated startup and operating costs for each 
company totaled $3.994 million.185 For each year thereafter, the report 
estimated that the annual maintenance and operations of the new 
compliance system would require 9,660 hours per entity, estimating 
costs of $1.245 million per entity, per year.186 
Note that these figures are attributable to the costs of compliance 
only with the new rules in the section 385 regulations, and not inclusive 
of a corporation’s total tax compliance costs. Considering that these 
estimates were based on a sample using characteristics from only 
Fortune 100 companies and that the final regulations were narrowed in 
 
 178. See I.R.S. Notice 2016-17, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 636, 637 (Apr. 25, 2016). 
 179. For example, the hourly rate for tax attorneys typically ranges anywhere from $200 to $1,000 
per hour of work. See How Much Does a Tax Attorney Cost?, CROSS LAW (Jan. 16, 2017), 
http://www.crosslawgroup.com/blog/hiring-tax-attorney-worth-cost. 
 180. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 170, at 1. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 16. 
 183. Id. at 17 Table V-1. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 18. 
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scope so that they would not affect a number of smaller entities, these 
figures are likely fair estimates, as they consider only the costs of 
implementation and maintenance of compliance systems for larger 
companies. 
While the Treasury has decreased the number of transactions to 
which the documentation requirements apply, the compliance burdens 
of applicable transactions are the same. A group engaging in debt 
transactions will first need to (1) determine whether each type of 
transaction used falls within scope of the proposed and final regulations; 
(2) go through the list of new exceptions to the rules to determine the risk 
of recharacterization; and then (3) figure out how to organize a system 
that will support the transaction under the criteria outlined in the 
regulations. Because many related party debt transactions are 
documented by formal agreements, setting up this type of system could 
potentially require a significant amount of time and resources. 
III.  THE TREASURY’S PUNITIVE APPROACH PROVIDES  
A GREATER INCENTIVE FOR INVERSION 
A. DISCOURAGING U.S. RESIDENCE THROUGH COMPETITIVE 
DISADVANTAGE 
The Treasury has established as one of its goals the promotion of “a 
level playing field for U.S. financial institutions internationally, and to 
enhance U.S. competitiveness.”187 This goal, however, is contrary to the 
approach taken in the recent anti-inversion regulations, and the punitive 
regulatory approach in general. 
The foreign competition faced by U.S. corporations has grown as the 
globalization of business has accelerated. When globalization of business 
activities increased dramatically in the 1980s, competition for MNC 
investment grew as well.188 This resulted in other countries lowering 
corporate tax rates, adopting less burdensome corporate tax rules, and 
simplifying tax laws for MNCs.189 
The allure of inversion stems from the competitive disadvantages 
that flow from being taxed as a U.S. corporation.190 U.S.-based 
companies are at a disadvantage when compared to their foreign 
competitors because they can either operate in a high-tax jurisdiction, 
paying tax at a higher rate than the U.S. rate; or, if they attempt to lower 
 
 187. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2012–2015 12 (2012). 
 188. David C. Elkins, The Merits of Tax Competition in a Globalized Economy, 91 IND. L.J. 905, 
912 (2016). 
 189. Id. 
 190. James Mann, Note, Corporate Inversions: A Symptom of a Larger Problem, The Corporate 
Income Tax, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 521, 522 (2005). 
WILSON-69.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/22/17  12:50 AM 
December 2017] THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS 423 
 
the tax they pay, fall under Subpart F of the Code, which triggers 
immediate taxation at the U.S. tax rate.191 Thus, a U.S. company 
operating in a foreign jurisdiction will pay more in tax on every dollar 
than its competition within the same jurisdiction. All else equal, the lower 
amounts of after-tax income for the U.S. company create a disadvantage 
by reducing the company’s ability to set competitive prices, engage in 
financing activities, and invest, thus offering a greater after-tax return on 
investment.192 
The disadvantage of U.S. companies has steadily increased for a mix 
of reasons¾the high tax rate, the taxation of foreign profits, and the 
Subpart F rules.193 Constant changes and expansion of tax rules through 
regulations in the U.S. further accelerate the erosion of a U.S. company’s 
competitive position.194 The Treasury has persisted in its practice of 
responding to each transaction by adding to the complexity of the system, 
which has merely triggered new tax planning opportunities and 
increased the costs of doing business.195 By increasing the costs of doing 
business, the regulations increase the need for a company to make up for 
these disadvantages in other ways, for example, through inversion and 
earnings stripping. The 2016 regulations increase the incentive to 
relocate, just as the U.S. saw many of its corporations do after each set of 
anti-inversion regulations in order to avoid the consequences of the new 
rules and escape any further regulations that would likely follow.196 
While there certainly was a time when the strengths of the U.S. 
economy were enough to offset the disadvantages of its tax system, many 
other countries have grown to offer most of those same strengths, but 
with much less burden, and the U.S. has failed to adjust. By continuing 
this pattern of punitive regulation, the Treasury is attempting to repair 
the corporate inversion problem by the very approach that created it¾an 
uncompetitive corporate tax system. 
 
 
 191. NAT’L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, 2 INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 7 (2001), 
http://www.nftc.org/default/tax/fip/NFTC1a%20Volume2(1).pdf. 
 192. Id. at 12. 
 193. Id. at 13-14. 
 194. Id. at 14. 
 195. See, e.g., Tax Complexity, Compliance, and Administration: The Merits of Simplification in 
Tax Reform Hearing Before the Comm. On Fin. U.S. S., 114th Cong. 7 (2015) (statement of Mihir A. 
Desai, Ph.D., Mizuho Financial Group Professor of Finance & Professor of Law, Harvard University). 
 196. See supra Part II.A.1. 
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B. CREATING COSTS TO U.S. RESIDENCE THAT OUTWEIGH THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF INVERSION 
Another important policy concern in international taxation, as in all 
areas of taxation, is neutrality¾that tax laws be designed in a way that 
avoids affecting economic decision-making as much as possible.197 In the 
United States, the high corporate tax rate and taxation of worldwide 
profits already play a large role in disrupting this goal, as is evidenced by 
the amount of time and resources U.S. companies devote to tax planning, 
strategy, and avoidance.198 The added uncertainty and complexity 
brought by the regulations also adds pressure for a corporation to 
relocate to a less burdensome jurisdiction. Over time, these combined 
factors provide a significant incentive for inversion. 
1.   Remaining a U.S. Corporation versus Relocating to a Foreign 
Jurisdiction 
To put this all into perspective, take the very simplified example of 
two multinational corporations¾one domiciled in the U.S. and one in 
Luxembourg, each with one U.S. subsidiary and one foreign subsidiary, 
and each subsidiary produces $100 million in pre-tax earnings that it will 
distribute to the parent. 
a. The U.S. Company Falls Behind: The Cost of the Corporate 
Tax Rate 
Due to the different tax rate and treatment of foreign earnings, the 
U.S. Corporation will end up with $130 million of after-tax earnings, 
while the Luxembourg Corporation will end up with $145 million of  
after-tax earnings.199 With the U.S. Corporation already trailing $15 
million behind its foreign competition, consider now the time it takes 
each company just to file its tax returns. 
 
 197. See, e.g., Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 NAT’L 
TAX J. 487 (2003), http://www.jstor.org/stable/41790118 (presenting concepts of neutrality applied 
to proposals for tax reform in the United States). 
 198. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 170. 
 199. The tax on the earnings U.S. subsidiary of each corporation will be $35¾thirty-five percent 
U.S. tax rate applied to the $100 of earnings¾leaving $65 after-tax; while the tax on the foreign 
subsidiary will be $20¾twenty percent Luxembourg corporate tax rate applied to $100 of  
earnings¾leaving $80 after the foreign tax authorities have been paid, and leaving a total in after-tax 
earnings of $145. However, because the subsidiaries will distribute these earnings to the parent 
corporations, the dividend to the U.S. Corporation will be taxed at thirty-five percent as well; crediting 
the $20 already paid to the Luxembourg tax authorities on the amount, and leaving the U.S. 
Corporation with an additional $15 in taxes owed on the same amount. See I.R.C. § 901 (2010). 
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b. Falling Further Behind: The Cost of Compliance 
For the U. . Corporation, the average time committed to filing is 175 
hours, while the average time for the Luxembourg Corporation is 55 
hours.200 Based on Department of Labor data, the average hourly cost of 
tax and legal services is approximately $127 per hour, which puts U.S. 
Corporation further behind the Luxembourg company by slightly over 
$15,000 just for filing.201 
In addition to the cost of filing, U.S. Corporation has a team of 
lawyers and accountants to help the company navigate the ambiguity and 
complexity of the tax rules for MNCs. If U.S. Company is on the larger 
side, the extra legal and tax fees can be estimated to cost around $7.5 
million per year.202 Increasing this burden, the 2016 regulations are 
expected to impose costs of approximately $4 million in the year of 
implementation, and approximately $1.25 million to comply each year 
thereafter.203 
c. Loss of Ability to Compensate For Disadvantage 
Assume (somewhat safely) that the U.S. Corporation wants to avoid 
the tax on its foreign income. To achieve this goal, the U.S. Corporation 
will likely deem the foreign income as “permanently reinvested 
earnings,” and therefore not be taxed on the distribution.204 This, 
however, comes at the cost of not being able to currently use those 
earnings that are permanently reinvested, and thus the U.S. Corporation 
will need to make up for the unavailability of this income in other ways, 
for example, through intercompany loans.205 
 
 200. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PAYING TAXES 2016 123, 125 (10th ed. 2016), 
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/paying-taxes-2016/paying-taxes-2016.pdf. The compliance calculation 
in this report includes only compulsory payments, and takes into consideration only three types of 
taxes¾corporate income tax, sales tax, and labor taxes; and the preparation time includes the time to 
collect information necessary to compute tax liability, the time needed to actually file, and the time 
needed to make payments. Id. at 103. Thus, this report excludes any non-compulsory tax compliance 
hours, such as maintaining accounting data; planning and strategy to reduce liability, which includes 
the time spent interpreting regulations; audits, appeals, and dispute proceedings; and, possibly, tax 
penalties and prosecution proceedings. 
 201. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 170, at 17. 
 202. See JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER 
TEXAS 162 (4th ed. 2008) (finding that large companies in the U.S. pay about $5 million per year on 
tax matters, with many of the largest spending over $10 million). 
 203. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 170 at 17. 
 204. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, RECOGNITION OF INCOME TAXES 
TOPIC 740, § 30-25. 
 205. See supra Part II.C.1. For example, in 2010, HP used intercompany loans quite heavily, with 
two HP entities lending the parent about $6 billion in a single year. Kate Linebaugh, How Firms Tap 
Overseas Cash: U.S. Companies Can Borrow Millions of ‘Trapped’ Funds from Foreign Units If They 
Follow the Rules, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2013, at B1. 
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Referring back to the earlier example of intercompany debt under 
the 2016 regulations, the U.S. Corporation is now faced with the risk of 
having certain affiliate debt recharacterized as equity.206 To avoid this 
risk, the U.S. Corporation can seek more expensive external borrowing, 
which results in the loss of income to the group from the interest charged 
on the loan, the loss of deduction relating to the interest payments, and 
the likely higher cost of borrowing from a third party.207 
d. Inversion-Related Costs Can Be Less Than the Cost To 
Comply With the 2016 Regulations Alone 
The actual costs incurred in inversion are difficult to gauge, as they 
depend on specific characteristics of a company. However, for example, 
consider a company with similar characteristics to Altisource Portfolio 
Solutions, a formerly U.S. corporation, which inverted to Luxembourg in 
2009.208 Altisource incurred one-time inversion-related fees of $3.4 
million.209 If Altisource were subject to the 2016 anti-inversion 
regulations, the legal and accounting costs incurred for its inversion 
would be more than $2 million less than the cost of compliance with the 
regulations in the first two years.210 
Altisource reduced its tax liability by nearly $12 million following its 
inversion, reducing its effective tax rate from thirty percent in 2009 as a 
U.S. corporation to ten percent in 2011 as a resident of Luxembourg.211 
In addition, the company recognized revenue of $423.7 million in 2011, 
as compared to $103 million in revenue in 2009, which grew to over $1 
billion by 2016.212 
While not every firm will have the same characteristics as the 
example of the Altisource inversion, the fact that a firm can pay less in 
one-time legal fees to completely relocate than it would to implement the 
requirements of a single set of regulations indicates that anti-inversion 
regulations, at least for certain companies, can have the effect of 
encouraging inversion. For companies in similar situations, not only 
could inversion increase the value to shareholders through the 
availability of resources otherwise allocated to U.S. tax and tax 
 
 206. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 207. Id. 
 208. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 10-K: ALTISOURCE PORTFOLIO SOLUTIONS, S.A. (Dec. 31, 2009). 
 209. Id. at 21. 
 210. This figure is the result of the approximately $4 million estimated in startup fees and $1.2 
million in annual fees thereafter estimated under the 2016 Section 385 regulations, less the amount 
Altisource paid for professional services on the inversion. See id.; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra 
note 170. 
 211. Id. at 29. 
 212. Id. at 3; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 10-K: ALTISOURCE PORTFOLIO SOLUTIONS, S.A. (Dec. 
31, 2015). 
WILSON-69.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/22/17  12:50 AM 
December 2017] THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS 427 
 
compliance, but it may be the only option of remaining competitive or 
sustaining the enterprise. 
For a larger company, the added cost to comply with the 
documentation requirements under the regulations may not be as 
damaging as it is likely to be to a smaller company. However the loss of 
flexibility in internal financing will likely interrupt a significant amount 
of routine transactions and result in higher costs in outside borrowing. 
Because of the way debt has traditionally been treated under the Code, 
these companies have relied heavily on intercompany financing, with 
related party debt transactions totaling multiple billions in a single 
year.213 Limiting the ability to continue these transactions disrupts a 
major feature of how these companies operate and removes one of the 
few ways in which a company can attempt to make up for the competitive 
disadvantages it faces by remaining in the U.S., thus increasing the 
incentive for inversion. 
CONCLUSION 
Through the seemingly endless regulations issued by the Treasury, 
the goal of the U.S. appears to be to reduce the tax benefits that a 
company can receive with a foreign legal address, thus reducing the 
incentive to invert. However, the Treasury should redirect its focus to the 
benefits the United States can receive from creating a more welcoming 
tax home for corporations. Of the three main factors driving corporations 
out of the U.S.¾the corporate tax rate, a worldwide system, and 
increasingly burdensome and complex regulations¾the Treasury’s 
authority to issue rules under the Code consumes the most time, results 
in more confusion, and creates greater costs for corporations. 
Taking into account the goals of a corporation and the factors 
impacting location decisions for multinational companies¾the high 
corporate tax rate on a company’s worldwide income in the United 
States; the existing costs of compliance for a U.S. company; the estimated 
costs of compliance under the 2016 regulations; and the diminished 
ability to compensate for these disadvantages through certain 
practices¾when compared to the potential costs and benefits available 
through inversion, corporations have an incentive to invest slightly more 
initially to relocate, rather than undergo the added annual costs of 
compliance required by the rules and the potential costs of any new 
regulations the Treasury may issue. 
Rather than trying to discourage tax avoidance by increasing tax 
liability¾by making what was once tax-deductible interest into taxable 
dividends and by increasing the tax burden by adding costly and time-
 
 213. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 200. 
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consuming compliance requirements¾the next administration should 
veer away from the punitive approach and simplify the tax system in a 
way that allows U.S. MNCs to compete with international competitors. 
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